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Abstract
We investigate Maxwell’s attempt to justify the mathematical assumptions be-
hind his 1860 Proposition IV according to which the velocity components of
colliding particles follow the normal distribution. Contrary to the commonly
held view we find that his molecular collision model plays a crucial role in
reaching this conclusion, and that his model assumptions also permit inference
to equalization of mean kinetic energies (temperatures), which is what he in-
tended to prove in his discredited and widely ignored Proposition VI. If we take
a charitable reading of his own proof of Proposition VI then it was Maxwell,
and not Boltzmann, who gave the first proof of a tendency towards equilibrium,
a sort of H-theorem. We also call attention to a potential conflation of notions
of probabilistic and value independence in relevant prior works of his contem-
poraries and of his own, and argue that this conflation might have impacted his
adoption of the suspect independence assumption of Proposition IV.
Keywords: Maxwell, kinetic theory, statistical mechanics, normal
distribution, independence, H-theorem, second law of thermodynamics,
condition A
1. Introduction
James Clerk Maxwell’s early work on the kinetic theory of gases was a major
step-stone in the introduction of probabilistic methods into physics. Proposition
IV of Maxwell’s (1860) Illustrations of the Dynamical Theory of Gases, his first
derivation of the velocity distribution law, is frequently cited as “one of the most
important passages in physics” (Truesdell, 1975, p. 34) and as such had been
thoroughly investigated in the works of S. G. Brush (1958; 1971; 1976; 1983),
M. C. Dias (1994), C. W. F. Everitt (1986a), E. Garber (1970), C. C. Gillispie
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(1963), P. M. Heimann (1970), T. M. Porter (1981), C. Truesdell (1975), J.
Uffink (2007) and other historians of science. Proposition IV shows that, given
certain assumptions, the three velocity components of molecules of a box of gas
follow the normal distribution and the speed (the magnitude of velocity) follows
what nowadays is called the Maxwell-Boltzmann distribution.
This paper provides a new conceptual and historical analysis of Maxwell’s
derivation. We make four contributions to the literature. First, the paper
sheds new light on the logical structure of Proposition IV and gives the first
detailed analysis of how Maxwell attempted to physically justify the three main
mathematical assumptions on which it rests. This allows us to show, second,
that contrary to the common historical wisdom molecular collisions did play an
essential role in establishing the conclusion of Proposition IV: one of its three
mathematical assumptions requires a prior lemma showing that collisions among
particles of the same mass bring about an equilibrium velocity distribution, and
we argue that Maxwell indeed made an attempt to lend credence to such an
approach to equilibrium on the basis of his Propositions I–III.
To substantiate this claim we take a look at Maxwell’s remarks preceding
Proposition IV as well as at his attempt to arrive at a proof of tendency to-
wards equilibrium in his discredited and widely ignored Proposition VI. We
present a surprisingly simple proof of tendency towards equilibrium that rests
on Propositions I–III, both in the relevant special case when all particles have
the same mass and in the general case when masses differ. Although this proof
of equalization of temperatures is interesting in its own right and is not known
by experts, we argue that it is not novel since its general case is nothing but
a charitable reconstruction of Maxwell’s Proposition VI. Since the charitable
reading of Proposition VI provides a proof of tendency towards equilibrium in
the general case, and since the special case of this proof is really simple, it is
reasonable to assume that Maxwell’s brief remarks preceding Proposition IV are
at least partially motivated by this special case. Additionally, if the charitable
reading is tenable then Maxwell preceded Ludwig Boltzmann by at least 6 years
in providing a mechanical argument for tendency towards equilibrium, and this
priority of Maxwell should be more widely recognized.
Fourth, the paper contributes to the scholarly discussion of the crucial and
arguably unjustified probabilistic independence assumption of Proposition IV.
The conflation of different interpretations of probability have already been
pointed out in the literature as a potential source of Maxwell’s mistake in ac-
cepting this independence assumption; besides furthering this analysis we also
provide a novel interpretation according to which Maxwell, instead of conflating
different interpretations of probability, might have conflated different notions
of independence. We distinguish two notions – probabilistic independence and
value (or parameter) independence –, argue that their difference was not clear in
the relevant works of Clausius and Herschel, and point out that in fact Herschel
mistakenly emphasized that it is the satisfaction of value independence that is
crucial for the proof that Maxwell allegedly have adapted as his Proposition IV.
Thus if Maxwell indeed adapted the proof from Herschel’s review article then he
also likely to have accepted Herschel’s assessment of the assumption on which
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Illustrations locus Content Section(s)
Proposition I–III Analysis of particle collisions; 4, 6, 7
Condition M appears as a hidden
assumption of Proposition II.
‘If a great many equal Claim that collisions would lead 5, 7
spherical particles to a stable kinetic energy (tempe-
were in motion [...]’ rature) and velocity distribution.
Proposition IV Derivation of velocity distribution. 2, 3, 6, 7
Proposition V Derivation of relative velocity (2)
distribution.
Proposition VI Collisions lead to an equalization 5, 7
of temperatures of a mix of gases.
Table 1: Linear structure of the beginning of the Illustrations of the Dynamical Theory of
Gases ((1860)) with the sections where they are analyzed in this paper.
“the whole force of the proof turns.” This in turn could explain why Maxwell
was content with the physical justification of the independence assumption since
value independence of the velocity components would have appeared immedi-
ately clear. Although there seems to be no conclusive evidence deciding which
of these two conflations were committed by Maxwell (maybe both), we point out
that in his prior and contemporaneous work Maxwell means value independence
when he is discussing “independence”.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 starts with a reconstruction of
Maxwell’s proof of Proposition IV and identifies the three mathematical assump-
tions (of existence, independence, and symmetry) that are required for the proof
to work. We work backwards from here, first historically, then conceptually. We
recall Maxwell’s own wording of his proof of Proposition IV and contrast it with
a proof of Herschel that has been identified by historians as its likely source. Sec-
tion 3 also briefly reviews the existing historical literature regarding Maxwell’s
attempt to justify the mathematical assumptions of Proposition IV. Section 4
reviews the particle collision model of Maxwell’s Proposition I–III and identifies
a crucial assumption (Condition M) that is needed for Proposition II to work.
Section 5 shows how Proposition I–III and Condition M can be used to argue
for the equalization of mean kinetic energies and contrasts the argument with
Maxwell’s Proposition VI. Section 6 distinguishes between two independence
notions and calls attention to the conflation of these two notions in the works
of Herschel, Clausius, and Maxwell. Section 7 puts the pieces back together by
analyzing the extent to which the three aforementioned mathematical assump-
tions of Proposition IV – that of existence (Section 7.1), independence (Section
7.2), and symmetry (Section 7.3) – could be physically justified by Maxwell’s
collision model.
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2. Proposition IV – Maxwell’s derivation
As we know from a 1859 letter to George Gabriel Stokes (Maxwell, 1859,
p. 277), Maxwell’s interest in the kinetic theory of gases was aroused by the
papers of Rudolf Clausius. Clausius was mainly interested in explaining heat
in terms of molecular motion, and in his 1857 article he used an elastic sphere
model to establish a connection between the average kinetic energy and the
pressure of the gas. This treatment met the criticism of a Dutch meteorologist,
C. H. D. Buys–Ballot (1858): if, as calculations suggest, the molecules of a
gas move at speeds of several hundreds meters per second, odors released in
one corner of a room should almost instantly be noticed in the other corner. To
answer the objection, Clausius (1859) attempted to show that repeated collisions
prevent molecules from traveling for great distances in straight lines. These
considerations led him to introduce the notion of the mean free path (for further
historical details see Brush et al. (1986a)). Maxwell developed the approach
further in his Illustrations of the Dynamical Theory of Gases (Maxwell, 1860).
The main goal of Herapath, Waterston, Kro¨nig and Clausius was to establish
the kinetic theory as a bridge between thermodynamics and atomic theory.
However, the focus of the Illustrations is on problems of viscosity, diffusion and
heat conduction: Maxwell attempted to treat these as special cases of a general
process in which momentum or energy is transported by molecular motion. To
investigate these transport properties he relied on results he derived about the
velocity distribution of a gas in his Proposition IV.
Proposition IV aims to show that in a box of gas the number of particles
whose velocity component in a particular direction lies between vx and vx+dvx is
proportional to e−
v2x
a2 and that the number of particles whose speed lies between
v and v + dv is proportional to v2e−
v2
a2 , where a is a parameter which gets
determined later. In essence the proof relies on the fact that the only solution
of the functional equation
f2(0) · f(|~v|) = f(vx) · f(vy) · f(vz) (1)
is the Gaussian
f(vx) = C · eA·v2x . (2)
Equation (1) arises from three assumptions: that
(A1) a stationary velocity distribution exists;
(A2) the components of velocity in an orthogonal coordinate system are inde-
pendent;
(A3) the velocity distribution only depends on the magnitude of the velocity.
If we denote the stationary velocity distribution of (A1) with f(~v) and if by
“independence” we mean probabilistic independence (treating the velocity com-
ponents as random variables) then (A2) translates to f(~v) = fx(vx)fy(vy)fz(vz)
and (A3) translates to rotational symmetry of f , namely that there exists a
4
function g for which f(~v) = g(|~v|). Noting that fx, fy, and fz are distributions
it is easy to show that f
.
= fx = fy = fz and that g(.) = f
2(0) · f(.), leading
to equation (1) . Let us quote Maxwell’s own proof (with a minor change of
notation).
Prop. IV. To find the average number of particles whose velocities
lie between given limits, after a great number of collisions among a
great number of equal particles.
Let N be the whole number of particles. Let vx, vy, vz be the
components of the velocity of each particle in three rectangular di-
rections, and let the number of particles for which vx lies between
vx and vx + dvx, be Nf(vx)dvx, where f(vx) is a function of vx to
be determined.
The number of particles for which vy lies between vy and vy + dvy
will be Nf(vy)dvy; and the number for which vz lies between vz
and vz +dvz will be Nf(vz)dvz, where f always stands for the same
function.
Now the existence of the velocity vx does not in any way affect that of
the velocities vy or vz, since these are all at right angles to each other
and independent, so that the number of particles whose velocity lies
between vx and vx+dvx, and also between vy and vy+dvy, and also
between vz and vz + dvz, is
Nf(vx)f(vy)f(vz)dvxdvydvz.
If we suppose the N particles to start from the origin at the same
instant, then this will be the number in the element of volume
(dvxdvydvz) after unit of time, and the number referred to unit of
volume will be
Nf(vx)f(vy)f(vz).
But the directions of the coordinates are perfectly arbitrary, and
therefore this number must depend on the distance from the origin
alone, that is
f(vx)f(vy)f(vz) = φ(v
2
x + v
2
y + v
2
z).
Solving this functional equation, we find
f(vx) = Ce
Av2x , φ(v2) = C3eAv
2
.
(Maxwell, 1860, pp. 289-290)
By applying the fact that the total number of particles is finite and fixing the
constants, f(vx) turns out to be the normal distribution,
1
a
√
pi
e−
v2x
a2 . Thus,
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Maxwell concludes, the number of particles whose velocity in a given direction
lies between vx and vx + dvx is
dNvx+dvxvx = N
1
a
√
pi
e−
v2x
a2 dvx (3)
and the number whose speed lies between v and v + dv is
dNv+dvv = N
4
a3
√
pi
v2e−
v2
a2 dv. (4)
According to Proposition V we can obtain similar results for the distribution
of relative velocities of pairs of randomly chosen particles: the components of
relative velocities also follow the normal distribution. Proposition VI intends
to show that collisions lead to the equalization of the mean kinetic energies
of systems of particles of different masses. From these results, mean values of
various functions of velocities used in determining the viscosity and diffusion
coefficients could be expressed in terms of a, the standard deviation of the ve-
locities. But it’s not just the derivation of mean values that had significance, for
many physical properties of gases depend on the actual distribution of molec-
ular velocity. Although the qualitative idea that even at constant temperature
different molecules have different velocities was often assumed in verbal formu-
lations – e.g. in Clausius’ (1857a, pp. 113-116) explanation of evaporation –
equations (3) and (4) are the first quantitative, experimentally verifiable results
of the kinetic theory of heat.
3. Proposition IV – historical treatment
On the basis of indirect evidence, several authors (Gillispie, 1963; Brush
et al., 1986a) have suggested that Maxwell simply adapted the derivation of
Proposition IV from a work in statistics, most probably relying on a July 1850
Edinburgh Review article by Sir William Herschel on Quetelet’s collection of es-
says on probability (Herschel, 1850). The review was also reprinted in Herschel’s
Essays in 1857, and we know from an early 1858 letter (Campbell & Garnett,
1882, pp. 301-302) that Maxwell read and “liked” these essays.
In this 57 pages long, typical Victorian-style review, Herschel first gives
his own analysis of the subject and praises Quetelet’s work on the derivation
of the law of least squares. But, to make the subject more palpable to non-
mathematical readers, Herschel comes up with a new, “simple, general, and
perfectly elementary proof of the principle in question,” based on the following
three assumptions:
We set out from three postulates. 1st, that the probability of a
compound event, or of the concurrence of two or more independent
simple events, is the product of the probabilities of its constituents
considered singly; 2nd, that there exists a relation or numerical law
of connexion (at present unknown) between the amount of error
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committed in any numerical determination and the probability of
committing it, such that the greater the error the less its proba-
bility, according to some regular LAW of progression, which must
necessarily be general and apply alike to all cases, since the causes
of error are supposed alike unknown in all; and it is on this ignorance,
and not upon any peculiarity on cases, that the idea of probability
in the abstract is founded; 3dly, that errors are equally probable if
equal in numerical amount, whether in excess, or in defect of, or
in any way beside the truth. This latter postulate necessitates our
assuming the function of probability to be what is called in math-
ematical language an even function, or a function of the square of
the error, so as to be alike for positive and negative values; and the
postulate itself is nothing more than the expression of our state of
complete ignorance of the causes of error, and their mode of action.
(Herschel, 1850, pp. 19-20)
In the course of the derivation Herschel adds that the independence assump-
tion applies to deviations in a rectangular direction: “the observed oblique
deviation is equivalent to the two rectangular ones, supposed concurrent, and
which are essentially independent from one another” (Herschel, 1850, p. 20).
Together with this later addition Herschel’s three main assumptions – existence
of a distribution of deviations, probabilistic independence of the deviations in a
rectangular direction, and spherical symmetry of the distribution – are similar
to those of Maxwell. Herschel’s derivation of the functional form, albeit in a
verbalized form, proceeds in the same way as Maxwell’s, the main difference
being that Herschel considers two rather than three dimensions and that he
shows no interest in calculating the distribution of the magnitude of the errors.
Even if Maxwell adopted Herschel’s derivation it is natural to ask whether
Maxwell tried to justify the mathematical assumptions of Proposition IV. Ac-
cording to Maxwell the conclusion of Proposition IV is intended to apply “after
a great number of collisions among a great number of equal particles” takes
place. Proposition IV of the Illustrations is preceded by three other proposi-
tions that describe the nature and effects of particle collisions. Yet we find that
the historical literature pays very little to no attention to these prior findings
of Maxwell; we typically find half-sentence-remarks about the role Propositions
I–III played in the argumentation, with as many different half-sentence-remarks
as there are historians making them.
The only pertaining remark Porter (1981, pp. 98-99) – who explicitly deals
with the history of statistics and probability theory that lies in the background
of Proposition IV – makes is that Maxwell’s “kinetic gas model [...] was subject
to a nearly infinite number of minute causes of deviation, and it displayed perfect
statistical regularity,” and this somehow “led Maxwell to the insight that the
distribution of molecular velocities probably conformed to [the error] curve.” It
is rather unclear from this remark how Maxwell is supposed to have been led
to his insight or even just what the insight of Maxwell was; understood strictly
Porter’s description is misleading since Maxwell did not make a probabilistic
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statement about the conformity of the actual velocity distribution to the normal
distribution.
Truesdell (1975, p. 34) mentions that Maxwell’s work “begins [...] with con-
sideration of the impact of two spheres” but he doesn’t attribute any importance
to this part of Maxwell’s paper.
Other historians generally assume that Maxwell’s analysis of molecular col-
lisions has something to do with underpinning Proposition IV, but we find no
clear consensus about the motivations. The longest treatment, referred to by
many subsequent historical articles, comes from Brush (1958, p. 243-244) (re-
peated almost verbatim in Brush (1976, pp. 185-186)) whose length still permits
it to be quoted in full:
[Maxwell] began by pointing out that, if two elastic spheres collide,
all directions of rebound are equally likely. He apparently believed
that this fact would ensure, not only that all directions of motion
were equally probable in the gas, but also that the probability dis-
tribution for each component of the velocity was independent of the
values of other components.
In other words Brush suggests that Maxwell’s analysis of particle collisions was
aimed at justifying the probabilistic independence assumption (A2) and the
rotational symmetry assumption (A3) but he provides no details about how
Maxwell’s justification is supposed to have proceeded. It is also not clear what
Brush means by “pointing out”; as we will see later in this respect Heimann
(1970, p. 194) is slightly more accurate when he says in his half sentence remark
that “Maxwell assumed that all motions [of the particles] were equally probable”
(although, as we will see, Maxwell’s assumptions only implied that after rebound
all directions of motion are equally probable).
According to Brush et al. (1986a, p. 7) Maxwell claimed that “when a moving
sphere collides with with another fixed sphere randomly placed in its path, the
direction in which it rebounds is distributed with equal probability over each
element of solid angle” (this is incorrect since Maxwell did not assume any of
the particles to be fixed), and they further state – without providing any further
details or evidence – that Maxwell used this claim to argue that “the distribution
law has an explicit functional form”.
Uffink (2007, p. 944) mentions en passant that Maxwell realized that the
“velocities [of the particles] will suffer incessant change due to mutual colli-
sions” but he implies that Maxwell’s reference to collisions is, with Maxwell’s
own remark made 20 years later about certain derivations in the works of others,
“rather for the sake of enabling the reader to form a mental image of the ma-
terial system than as a condition for the demonstration” (ibid. p. 948). Uffink
also emphasizes that the assumptions of Maxwell’s Proposition IV, despite ap-
pearances and in contrast to Maxwell’s subsequent proof of 1867, “do not refer
to collisions at all” (ibid. p. 948; see also his contrast with Maxwell’s 1867 proof
on ibid. p. 950).
Dias (1994) is the only exception in giving an extensive treatment of Maxwell’s
collision model but the focus of the paper is on exploring the connections be-
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tween Maxwell’s Proposition II and later debates of the 1890s on the Stosszahlansatz;
Dias does not address what role, if any, Maxwell’s collision model played in jus-
tifying the assumptions of Proposition IV.
The scant attention paid to the justification question may stem from histo-
rians unanimously following Brush’s 1958 reconstruction of Proposition IV as a
proof resting on two assumptions, that of probabilistic independence (A2) and
of rotational symmetry (A3), and they are at best only tacit about the need
for a third assumption (A1) that a stationary velocity distribution exists (see
i.e. Brush (1976, pp. 185-186, pp. 342-343), Heimann (1970, p. 194), Porter
(1981, p. 98), Uffink (2007, 945)). They do so despite acknowledging the anal-
ogy with Herschel’s derivation pointed out by Gillispie, five years after Brush’s
1958 reconstruction, in 1963. As we have seen Hershel explicitly emphasized a
third assumption, that there must “exists a relation or numerical [...] regular
LAW of progression, which must necessarily be general and apply alike to all
cases” (Herschel, 1850, pp. 19-20; emphasis in original), which adapted to the
kinetic theory translates as the assumption of the existence of a stationary ve-
locity distribution, our (A1). By only explicitly acknowledging two assumptions
instead of three the natural guess might have been that what Maxwell tried to
do with his collision model was to physically justify one or both of these two
assumptions. Since without a detailed analysis of Maxwell’s collision model
only superficial analogies are apparent between Maxwell’s prior results and as-
sumptions (A2)–(A3) these prior results of Maxwell were supposedly aimed at
justifying, and since Maxwell himself later abandoned the independence assump-
tion (A2) describing it as being “precarious” (Maxwell, 1867, p. 437), it could
have been tempting to glance over the opening part of Maxwell’s paper as being
non-consequential to the argument presented in Proposition IV.
We are going to argue that the most plausible role the collision model played
in Maxwell’s thinking is in justifying assumption (A1), although our analysis
of Maxwell’s collision model also sheds light on the extent to which his prior
results are capable to support assumptions (A2) and (A3) beyond the superficial
analogies. To do this we start with a brief reconstruction of his Propositions
I–III.
4. Propositions I–III and Condition M – particle collisions
In the beginning of the first chapter, “On the Motion and Collision of Per-
fectly Elastic Spheres,” Maxwell presents us with three Propositions concerning
the interaction of particles. Proposition I and Proposition III are straight-
forward exercises in Newtonian mechanics that establish the motion of two
particles – modeled by perfectly elastic spheres of non-zero radii s, S and of
mass m, M – after they collide. It is assumed that the particles do not in-
teract aside such pairwise collisions. In modern notation Maxwell calculates
the encounter operator (~v, ~V , ρ) 7→ (~v ′, ~V ′) where ~v, ~V are the velocities of the
particles before the impact, ~v ′, ~V ′ are the velocities after impact, and ρ is a
further parameter describing the impact in the following way. Let ~r = ~v−~vCM
9
Figure 1: ~r, ~R: velocities relative to the center of mass. C: circle of radii s+ S centered on
the second particle in the plane perpendicular to ~r. ρ: point where the line of motion of the
first particle intersects circle C.
be the velocity of the first particle relative to the velocity of the center of mass
~vCM =
1
m+M (m~v + M
~V ) before impact and let C be a circle of radius s + S
that lies in the plane perpendicular to ~r, C being centered on the center of the
second particle. For a collision to take place the line of motion of the first par-
ticle needs to intersect C; ρ is the position of this intersection within C. (See
Figure 1.)
Due to conservation of momentum the collision does not affect the velocity
of the center of mass: ~v ′CM = ~vCM . Maxwell shows that a perfectly elastic
collision alters the direction of the relative velocity but it keeps its magnitude
intact:
~r ′ = r · ~u(ρ), (5)
and therefore the velocity after impact can be expressed as
~v ′ = ~vCM + r · ~u(ρ), (6)
where r = |~r| and ~u(ρ) is a direction of unit length depending on the position
ρ within the circle C. (Mutatis mutandis for the ~R = ~V − ~vCM velocity of the
second particle relative to the center of mass.)
Maxwell also claims to have proven that whenever a collision takes place all
directions of rebound are equally likely in the center of mass frame. What his
Proposition II actually shows is that if the assumption that
Condition M the impact parameter ρ is distributed uniformly within the circle
C
holds then
Condition A the ~u(ρ) directions of rebound relative to the center of mass are
distributed uniformly on the surface of the unit sphere.
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The name Condition A is due to S. H. Burbury (1894) who invoked it in a
debate on the pages of Nature with G. H. Bryan about Boltzmann’s H-theorem.
Condition M is the terminology we introduce here to distinguish Condition A
from the assumption Maxwell actually made during the proof of Proposition
II. Since in Maxwell’s particle model Condition M and Condition A imply each
other they tend to be identified (for such an exchange of conditions see i.e. Dias
(1994, p. 347)). Maxwell himself neither emphasizes nor attempts to justify
Condition M; he merely asserts that “within this circle [C] every position [ρ]
is equally probable” (Maxwell, 1860, p. 288), and in the coming years he keeps
referring to the conclusion of Proposition II as if it were unconditional (see e.g.
Maxwell (1863, p. 339); for a further analysis of Condition A and the Nature
debate see Dias (1994)).
The conclusion drawn from Propositions I–III is that the ~v ′ velocity of a
particle after impact consists of two components: the first is the ~vCM velocity
of the center of mass, which is determined by the ~v and ~V incoming velocities,
and the second is the ~r ′ velocity relative to the center of mass, whose magnitude
is determined by the incoming velocities, but whose direction is not determined
by the incoming velocities, but may with equal probability be in any direction.
5. Proposition VI – tendency towards equilibrium
After being done with Propositions I–III, but before turning his attention to
Proposition IV, Maxwell makes the following remark about the effect of many
collisions:
If a great many equal spherical particles were in motion in a per-
fectly elastic vessel, collisions would take place among the particles,
and their velocities would be altered at every collision; so that after
a certain time the vis viva will be divided among the particles ac-
cording to some regular law, the average number of particles whose
velocity lies between certain limits being ascertainable, though the
velocity of each particle changes at every collision. (Maxwell, 1860,
p. 289)
Thus Maxwell claims that after sufficient number of collisions the kinetic ener-
gies become distributed along a non-changing distribution. This implies that
some sort of process that brings about this distribution of kinetic energies takes
place, apparently due to the collisions these particles go through.
On the surface of it Maxwell’s remark strikes as an expression of hope rather
than an argument. Is there any evidence that Maxwell had good reasons to
hold that Propositions I–III are capable of supporting a claim about tendency
towards equilibrium? The answer is affirmative, and this becomes clear if we
jump ahead to Proposition VI in which Maxwell argues that when two gases
mix their temperatures equalizes. This argument is unknown in the historical
and in the physics literature and since besides being relevant to the question
of justification of an assumption of Proposition IV it is also interesting and
historically significant on its own right, we now briefly reconstruct it.
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Figure 2: ~v, ~V : incoming velocities; ~vCM : velocity of center of mass; ~r = ~v−~vCM : velocity of
the first particle relative to the center of mass; ~v ′: velocity of the first particle after rebound;
α = ∠(~v, ~V ): angle between incoming velocities; γ = ∠(~r ′, ~vCM ): angle of rebound.
5.1. The reconstructed argument for tendency towards equilibrium
When two particles, modeled as perfectly elastic spheres of mass m and M ,
collide the difference between their kinetic energies after the collision can be
readily expressed as a function of the difference between their kinetic energies
before the collision:(
mv ′2
2
− MV
′2
2
)
= C0 ·
(
mv2
2
− MV
2
2
)
+ C1 · cosα+ C2 · cos γ, (7)
where α is the angle enclosed by the incoming velocities whose magnitude is v
and V and γ is the angle enclosed by the velocity of the center of mass ~vCM with
the relative rebound velocity ~r ′ (see Figure 2; for calculation of the coefficients
see the Appendix). Propositions I–III together with Condition M entail that
~r ′ may point to all directions with equal probability, which means there is an
equal chance that the angle of rebound γ falls between γ¯ and γ¯+dγ¯ or between
180o − γ¯ and 180o − γ¯ − dγ¯.
Consider now collisions between many particles during a time interval ∆t,
and let us write (k, l) ∈ Iαv,V whenever k is a particle of mass m, l is a particle
of mass M , and k and l collide during ∆t with respective incoming speeds v, V
and angle of income α. We assume that ∆t is long enough for |Iαv,V | to be large
but short enough to allow for at most one collision for each particle. Let us sum
up equations (7) for all collision pairs in Iαv,V by assuming that Condition M
holds for all these particle collisions independently. Since then all directions of
rebound occur with equal frequency and since C2 only depends on m,M, v, V ,
and α which are now all fixed, the C2 · cos γ terms approximately cancel and we
get ∑
(k,l)∈Iαv,V
(
mv′2k
2
− MV
′2
l
2
)
≈ C0 ·|Iαv,V |·
(
mv2
2
− MV
2
2
)
+C1 ·|Iαv,V |·cosα. (8)
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Let us further assume that all directions of incoming velocities for the col-
liding particles occur with approximately equal frequency – an assumption that
Maxwell took for granted in his later derivations, i.e. in Maxwell (1867) – and
that the number of collisions is independent of the enclosed angle of income
(that |Iαv,V | is the same for all α, or at least that |Iαv,V | = |I−αv,V | for all α given
a fixed v and V ) and sum up for all possible angles of income. Since C1 only
depends on m,M, v, and V which are now all fixed, the C1 · |Iαv,V | · cosα terms
approximately cancel and we get∑
α
∑
(k,l)∈Iαv,V
(
mv′2k
2
− MV
′2
l
2
)
≈ C0 ·
∑
α
|Iαv,V | ·
(
mv2
2
− MV
2
2
)
. (9)
By further summing up for all possible magnitudes of incoming velocities v, V
on both sides of the equation we account for all collisions between particles of
mass m and M during ∆t exactly once, so a division with the total number of
such collisions and substituting for C0 yields
m̂v′2
2
− M̂V
′2
2
≈
(
m−M
m+M
)2
·
(
m̂v2
2
− M̂V
2
2
)
, (10)
meaning that the difference between the mean kinetic energies of the colliding
particles decrease after the collisions!
Any change in the difference between the mean kinetic energies (between
the temperatures) of all m-particles and of all M -particles during ∆t is due to
collisions between particles of different mass (expressed by equation (10)) since
the total kinetic energy of particles which do not collide and the total kinetic
energy of those particles that collide with another particle of the same mass
does not change during ∆t. If the particles that undergo collision during ∆t
are randomly drawn from the set of all particles then the larger the initial tem-
perature difference between m-particles and M -particles the larger the chance
that the drawn Iαv,V samples of colliding pairs also exhibit a mean kinetic energy
difference of the same sign. If the sign is the same then since due to (10) the
mean kinetic energy difference between the colliding pairs decreases during ∆t
it follows that the temperature difference of all m-particles and M -particles also
decreases. (If the sign is different then the temperature difference between the
gases increases, underlining that the present argument for tendency towards
equilibrium is statistical.) By repeating the argument for successive ∆t time
intervals it follows that the difference between temperatures of m-particles and
M -particles tends to vanish. When the temperature difference vanishes or be-
comes small the collisions continue to produce small temperature fluctuations
(due to the mean kinetic energy differences that may still occur in the random
sample of colliding particle pairs).
Note that the proof becomes extremely simple when we mix gases of different
temperature whose particles have the same mass. In this case equation (7)
simplifies to (
mv ′2
2
− mV
′2
2
)
= C2 · cos γ (11)
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and one only needs to invoke the first cancellation argument provided by Con-
dition M to conclude that the temperature difference decreases as collisions
take place. What we thus have is a simple, elegant, and elementary mechanical
argument for a statistical tendency towards equilibrium that is based on the
assumptions that
(i) particles can be modeled as perfectly elastic spheres,
(ii) the number, size, speed etc. of these particles is such that the time evolu-
tion can be split into successive time intervals during which each particle
has an approximately equal independent chance to participate in at most
one, pairwise collision, and
(iii) in this interval all directions of rebound occur with approximately the
same relative frequency (that for any pair of incoming velocity and for
the colliding particle pairs that have these incoming velocities the relative
frequency of the impact parameter is roughly the same for all positions on
the collision circle).
Although we know well from later developments that assumptions (ii) and (iii)
are difficult to square with the strict dynamical evolution entailed by (i), its
simplicity and its geometrically intuitive probabilistic assumptions could very
well allow the argument to fit in an undergraduate course on classical mechanics.
5.2. Proposition VI in the light of the reconstruction
How can it be that this simple argument for tendency towards thermal equi-
librium is unknown by historians and physics educators alike? The conclusion
that collisions bring about an equalization of temperatures is what Maxwell
draws in his Proposition VI after he derives a formula he interprets as (10) by
invoking his earlier results about collisions. Prima facie, however, Maxwell’s
proof seems rather baffling. What he seems to have calculated in his Proposi-
tion VI is the difference of kinetic energies of particles of mass m and M after
they collide in a specially arranged manner where (using the notation of the
previous subsection)
(p1) γ = 90o,
(p2) α = 90o,
(p3) v = v̂, V = V̂ .
By substituting assumptions (p1)-(p3) to equation (7) one gets
mv̂′2
2
− MV̂
′2
2
=
(m−M)2
(m+M)2
(
mv̂2
2
− MV̂
2
2
)
, (12)
which is the equation that Maxwell’s own derivation would have really estab-
lished. Maxwell curiously assumes that v̂ ′ = v̂ ′ and he also interprets (12) as
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if he had just derived (10) and proceeds to draw the conclusion about the long
term equalization of mean kinetic energies on the basis of it.
Thus the calculations of Proposition VI make Maxwell’s argument seem to
be dependent on a particular arrangement of incoming velocities and rebound
angle of a pair of particles, and it seems entirely unclear how he thought that an
argument about a particular collision of a pair of particles could allow for a valid
inference about averages over all collisions, or how the magnitude of velocity
after impact that initially equals the mean velocity could be substituted for the
mean of velocities after impact, or how the kinetic energy calculated from a
mean velocity could be substituted for a mean kinetic energy. On this basis
Maxwell’s proof, if mentioned at all, is dismissed in the historical literature as
a “rather lame argument” and the few historians who do devote more than a
footnote to it find it “amazing” that the otherwise brilliant Maxwell or “any of
his contemporaries who bothered to examine the argument in detail would have
accepted it” (Brush, 1976, p. 344).
In the light of the simple argument for equalization of kinetic energies we
outlined in the previous subsection – an argument that rest purely on Maxwell’s
Propositions I–III and invokes the same sort of calculations that Maxwell per-
forms during his proof of Proposition VI – it seems plausible that Maxwell was
being too terse instead of lame. It is clear from the geometry of collisions and
from the argument we gave above that for equation (7) averaging over all direc-
tions of rebound yields the same result as making assumption (p1), as a result
of which the third term cancels. This then justifies focusing on collisions with
perpendicular rebound angle as being sufficiently typical for the purposes of the
proof. It is also geometrically clear that averaging over all directions of incom-
ing velocities yield the same result as making assumption (p2), as a result of
which the second term cancels. This then would justify focusing on collisions
with perpendicular income angle as being sufficiently typical for the purposes
of the proof.
Propositions I–III motivates assumption (p1) but assumption (p2) is in need
of justification. Instead of invoking a further assumption that all directions of
incoming velocities are equally likely (like we did above, and as Maxwell did
in his later works), Maxwell sets the magnitude of the incoming velocities v, V
to equal their mean values given by Proposition IV (assumption (p3)), and he
further assumes (p4) that the magnitude of the relative velocity |~v−~V | equals its
mean value given by Proposition V. Since Proposition V shows that the square
of the mean relative velocity equals the sum of squares of the mean velocities,
and therefore that the two incoming velocities must be perpendicular, (p3) and
(p4) entail (p2). Assumptions (p3) and (p4) are also assumptions about typical
velocities, but they are not appropriate for the purposes of the proof. Albeit the
proof that proceeds directly along (p3) and (p4) is clearly suspect, (p3) and (p4)
might have been intended as mere short-cut for a more detailed argument that
rests on an averaging procedure over the incoming velocities, along the lines we
sketched above.
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Albeit this reconstruction still renders the proof of Proposition VI messy
and misleading, it allows us to see the arrangement choices Maxwell makes
during his derivation as geometrically intuitive shortcuts to an averaging pro-
cedure that rests on an application of the results of his Propositions I–III. If
we make the charitable assumption that Maxwell simply didn’t properly clean
up his proof, as opposed to making assumptions whose fallaciousness should
have been obvious, then his reconstructed Proposition VI becomes a convincing
demonstration of a tendency towards equilibrium that lives up to the standards
of its own time. Although the proof does depend on unjustified probabilistic
assumptions such as Condition M, in this regard it does not fare worse than
Boltzmann’s later attempts (starting with Boltzmann (1868)) to arrive at his
celebrated H-theorem, and thus it should reclaim its historical precedence over
Boltzmann’s demonstrations as being the first good “bad” mechanical proof of
tendency towards equilibrium.
The only historical side-remark I’m aware of that also suggests a direct
connection between Maxwell’s Propositions I–III and Boltzmann’s H-theorem
is a side remark of Dias (1994, p. 347) who says that
Maxwell (1860) invoked Proposition II to show how collisions ran-
domized the directions of motion of the molecules, bringing about
isotropy of pressure, as demanded by the equation of state for per-
fect gases. In this use, Proposition II becomes a kind of “proof” of
how equilibrium of pressure (transmission of linear momentum) sets
in, and thus is, metaphorically speaking, a sort of H-Theorem.
Although the connection between Proposition II and the randomization of di-
rection of motions of molecules is clear, I find no evidence for Dias’ claim that
Maxwell made any use of Proposition II to argue for the onset of the isotropy
of pressure (Dias provides none). From Dias’ reference to linear momentum I
suspect that his remark was based on a misinterpretation of what Proposition
VI aimed to show.
Maxwell never seem to have revisited Proposition VI. Around 1863 he be-
came dissatisfied with Clausius’ mean free path method and started to develop
a theory valid for any kind of force laws acting between particles, which he
came to treat as centers of force rather than colliding spheres with determinate
radii. With his new approach serious problems emerge concerning Proposition
I and III: as Maxwell’s 1867 calculations show, the motion of particles subject
to a never-vanishing repulsive force law in general depends on their incoming
relative velocity, so the angle of rebound also depends on this incoming relative
velocity. Although in his On the Dynamical Theory of Gases (1867) he chooses
a particular inverse 5th-power force law for which the angle of reflection is in-
dependent of the incoming relative velocity, this choice is poorly motivated and
gets abandoned later. His writings after 1867 indicate that he grew skeptical of
the possibility of justifying the Second Law on a mechanical basis (Uffink, 2007,
pp. 951–952).
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6. Value vs. probabilistic independence
Before analyzing the extent to which Proposition I–III, Condition M, and the
argument for an approach to equilibrium can be used to justify the mathematical
assumptions of Proposition IV it is worthwhile to take a look at how Maxwell,
Herschel, and Clausius understood what these mathematical assumptions, in
particular the independence assumption (A2), amounted to.
Let us start with Herschel’s understanding of the independence assumption
of his own proof. We note first that there is a small but important difference
between Herschel’s original 1850 review article and its 1857 reprint, which is
the version that Maxwell have likely read. In a footnote added to the 1857
reprint Herschel attempts to clarify what he means by independence of the
deviations of errors in different directions and emphasizes the importance of
this independence assumption:
That is, the increase or diminution [of the deviation] in one or [sic!]
which may take place without increasing or diminishing the other.
On this, the whole force of the proof turns. (Herschel, 1857, p. 400),
(Brush et al., 1986a, p. 11).
Although Maxwell’s likely adaptation of Herschel’s derivation became com-
mon wisdom in the historical literature, so far it has gone unnoticed by histori-
ans that in the quoted emphatic footnote Herschel actually mischaracterizes the
crucial necessary independence assumption of the derivation. A mathematically
correct derivation requires probabilistic independence of deviations in rectangu-
lar directions; according to Herschel, however, the whole force of the proof turns
on the assumption that a deviation in one direction does not impose a restric-
tion on the values a deviation in another direction may take, which is not the
same as probabilistic independence of the deviations.
Let us briefly distinguish these notions of independence. Let ξ and υ denote
physical quantities (i.e. velocity components) that can take values in the set X
and Y respectively. Suppose that we may not know what other quantities serve
as inputs that determine the momentary values of ξ and υ, but let us assume
that we might know about certain constraints that connect the values ξ and υ
can take in the following way. Let d : X → P(Y ) assign to each value x ∈ X
the set of values d(x) ⊆ Y that variable υ may take if we condition upon ξ
taking the value ξ = x. If d is single valued for all x ∈ X then if ξ takes a
value x then υ must take the only possible value in d(x): we may thus say that
ξ value determines υ. If d(x) has more than one element for at least one x ∈ X
then υ is partially value independent from ξ: for some value variable ξ may take
there are several possibilities that υ may take that are not determined by the
value of ξ. If d(x) = Y for all x ∈ X then υ is value independent from ξ: no
matter what value variable ξ takes that does not influence the possible values υ
may take. Finally when ξ and υ are random variables then υ is probabilistically
independent from ξ if for all x, y: Pr(ξ ≤ x∧υ ≤ y) = Pr(ξ ≤ x) ·Pr(υ ≤ y), or,
alternatively, when gξ,υ(x, y) = gξ(x)gυ(y) for the respective density functions.
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These independence notions are not equivalent with each other. Value inde-
pendence does not imply probabilistic independence: indeed the domains of two
value independent variables do not even need to be endowed with a probability
measure. Probabilistic independence also does not imply value independence: a
value x of ξ may prevent υ taking a value y without ruining probabilistic inde-
pendence of ξ and υ if the probability of the occurrence of x and y is zero. Value
independence is symmetric, and value independent variables are also partially
value independent but the converse is not the case.
It is clear both from Herschel’s derivation and from Maxwell’s proof of
Proposition IV that their “independence” assumption is meant to entail the
factorization of the probability distribution function. If by “independence” one
means probabilistic independence then factorization does follow and the proof
is correct; factorization however does not follow from value independence, which
Herschel mistakenly emphasized to be the crucial assumption of his derivation.
Now even if Maxwell adapted the derivation from Herschel’s article it is nat-
ural to assume that he had reasons to believe that the required mathematical
assumptions can be motivated by physical considerations about gases. Without
such physical considerations the application of the mere mathematical propo-
sition to gases would remain unjustified. But Maxwell’s attempt at physically
justifying independence of the velocity components would have clearly depended
on his understanding of the sense of independence he had believed to guarantee
the success of the proof. We are going to return to this point in Section 7.2.
Let us now turn to Clausius’ understanding of the meaning of independence.
In his summary of Maxwell’s Propositions I–III Clausius (1862, p. 424) claims
that the velocity of center of mass ~vCM quantifies the extent to which the
velocity after impact is “dependent” upon the velocities before impact while
the velocity relative to the center of mass ~r ′ quantifies the extent to which the
velocity after impact is “independent” from the velocities before impact. It is
not clear what Clausius meant here by “independence” since what he writes is
compatible with several different readings. Given Condition M ~r ′ may point
in any direction no matter what the incoming velocities ~v and ~V were, so it is
value independent since setting values for ~v and ~V does not restrict the range
of possible values for the direction of ~r ′. In the same vein ~v ′ is partially value
independent from ~v and ~V since setting values for ~v and ~V does narrow the range
of possible values of ~v ′ but ~v ′ may still take several values, not just one. Clausius
could also have meant that the direction of ~r ′ is probabilistically independent
from ~v and ~V : conditioning upon any value for ~v and ~V does not alter the
probability that ~r ′ points in a certain direction.
Upon a closer look what Clausius emphasizes in the text and in the accom-
panying footnote is that the incoming velocities do not determine the direction
of the velocities relative to the center of mass after impact and in turn they
do not fully determine the velocities after impact either, as these latter may
take several (indeed, infinitely many) different possible values for any fixed val-
ues of the incoming velocities. These remarks of Clausius are suggestive that
he intended to make a point about the partial value independence of the ve-
locities before and after impact, but there is no evidence that Clausius even
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distinguished between value independence and probabilistic independence.
Finally let us make a brief remark about Maxwell’s own usage of the term
“independent”. The term appears once more in the context of a generalization
of Proposition IV and Proposition V (ibid. p. 315) but the appearance does not
shed any more clarity on its intended interpretation than the proof of Proposi-
tion IV. In all other contexts in which the term “independent” appears in the
Illustrations (see p. 288, 298, 300) it is clear that Maxwell understands it as
referring to value independence. Taking a systematic look at Maxwell’s prior
and contemporary work on color vision (see esp. (Maxwell, 1855, pp. 120-121))
I also find that Maxwell systematically uses the term independent in the sense
of value independence.1
Indeed I find that ambiguous usage of the term “independent” is pervasive
in and before the 1860s. That different concepts are named by the same term
would not in itself be a problem if users of the term were conscious of their non-
interchangeability. Unfortunately it seems that this consciousness was missing
in the works of those, such as Clausius and Herschel, that most likely have
influenced Maxwell’s thinking, and there is no evidence that Maxwell was aware
of such distinction in and before his 1860 work on the kinetic theory.
7. Proposition IV – physical justification of its assumptions
7.1. (A1) The existence of a stationary velocity distribution
Let us now return to Maxwell’s Proposition IV. The paragraph preceding the
statement of Proposition IV, which we have already quoted, claims that after
large number of collisions the kinetic energy “will be divided among the particles
according to some regular law, the average number of particles whose velocity
lies between certain limits being ascertainable” (Maxwell, 1860, p. 289), meaning
that this number is not going to be further altered by subsequent collisions, that
is, that the velocity distribution becomes stationary.
Indeed without the assumption of stationarity it would be hard to under-
stand what enabled the presumption of the time-independent velocity distribu-
tion f right in the beginning of the proof of Proposition IV. But if Maxwell
1Judging by the number of his publications the topic Maxwell most vehemently pursued
in the years prior to and contemporaneous with his early research on the kinetic theory was
that of color vision. A previous draft of this paper argued that Maxwell’s own experimental
work on color vision provided him familiarity with statistical reasoning; in particular Maxwell
have encountered a use of distributions which is not rooted in error, ignorance, or uncertainty,
and hence understanding probabilities as being rooted in the physical phenomena was not
entirely new to him when he started working on the kinetic theory. On the basis of his drawn
figures it seems likely that this is also true in particular for the normal distribution. The draft
addressed the parallels Maxwell draws between color mixing in his three dimensional color
space and addition of vectors in three dimensions in mechanics. Finally it also elaborated
on the claim that in these prior works Maxwell understands the term independence as value
independence. At the request of a referee these sections got relocated in a separate historical
note.
19
succeeded to show that particle collisions lead to stationarity prior to Proposi-
tion IV then it would have been sufficient for him to assume, for the purposes of
the proof of Proposition IV, the existence of the right kind of particle collisions.
And this is what Maxwell actually says he does, to wit:
Prop. IV. To find the average number of particles whose velocities
lie between given limits, after a great number of collisions among a
great number of equal particles. (Emphasis added.)
That his analysis of particle collisions was in part intended to establish the
existence of a stationary velocity distribution is also clear from Maxwell’s later
remarks about his 1860 proof:
The only case in which I have determined the form of this [velocity
distribution] function [in the 1860 paper] is that of one or more kinds
of molecules which have by their continual encounters brought about
a distribution of velocity such that the number of molecules whose
velocity lies within given limits remains constant. (Maxwell, 1867,
p. 437) (Emphasis added.)
In addition we have also seen that the idea that molecular collisions could
lead to a stationary velocity distribution was more than baseless wishful think-
ing. We showed that Propositions I–III are indeed sufficient for a proof of
tendency towards equilibrium, which is what Maxwell intended to do with his
Proposition VI. In the special case when the masses are equal, which is the
relevant case for Proposition IV, we have also seen that the proof of equaliza-
tion of kinetic energies becomes so simple as to potentially warrant only verbal
referencing. The availability of a proof of reaching equalization of temperatures
lends credence for the availability of a proof of reaching a stationary velocity
distributions.
Thus we can conclude that Maxwell’s argument consists of two steps: a
‘lemma’ showing that particle collisions lead to stationarity, and a ‘theorem’ that
makes use of the lemma. It is then of course no surprise that reference to particle
collisions only appears in the statement of the theorem and is absent from the
proof following the statement, since all the work having to do with particle
collisions was previously delegated to the lemma; the proof of the theorem
itself only makes use of the assumption of stationarity that follows from the
lemma and its assumption about collisions. Establishing the conclusion of course
requires both establishing the lemma and establishing the theorem, and thus
Maxwell’s 1860 argument does crucially depend on particle collisions, contrary
to what historians of science (i.e. Brush et al. (1986a, p. 8), Uffink (2007,
p. 948)), who only focus on the proof that follows the statement of Proposition
IV, claim.
The extent to which Maxwell succeeded in establishing the lemma is, of
course, another question. Establishing that a certain tendency towards thermal
equilibrium does follow from the model assumptions is clearly significant, but
it is unclear to me how equalization of kinetic energies would strictly imply
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the onset of a stationary velocity distribution. If we conceptually divide the
particles of the gas into two large groups – say, red and blue – then Maxwell’s
results imply that after collisions continue for a long time the mean velocity
of all red particles will equal the mean velocity of all blue particles. This puts
a constraint on how the velocity distribution of all particles may change after
collisions. Since the division of particles to red and blue is arbitrary we end
up with many such similar constraints, and jointly all these constraints may be
sufficient to force the velocity distribution to become stationary. So much is
clear, but whether this is so requires an explicit argument rather than a hopeful
gesture.
Although this attempt stays close to the line of reasoning Maxwell himself
utilizes in the end of his proof of Proposition VI he does not elaborate on the
details of such or similar musings. He apparently thought that the evidence pro-
vided by Propositions I–III on the nature of particle collisions and his scattered
remarks preceding the statement of Proposition IV are sufficient to establish
that collisions lead to a stationary velocity distribution straightforwardly. Some
followers of Maxwell shared this view, although it progressively became more
clear that a proof of it, if possible at all, may not be easily befitted to a mar-
gin. Yet as late as 1890 we find proofs to the effect that Propositions I–III and
Condition A implies stationarity:
[Proposition] 6. (a) Every distribution of velocities among the molecules
which satisfies the condition that for given [velocity of the center of
mass of a pair of colliding particles] V all directions of [the velocity
of rebound relative to the center of mass] R are equally probable is
[...] stationary. (Burbury, 1890, p. 299)
One of the main difficulties with these proofs is that they sneak in a proba-
bilistic independence assumption in one form or another without appropriate
justification.
7.2. (A2) Probabilistic independence of velocity components
The most crucial assumption of the proof of Proposition IV is the factor-
ization of the velocity distribution to its marginals, which is a way to state the
probabilistic independence of the velocity components. Let us re-quote, in its
entirety, what Maxwell had to say about establishing this latter:
[...] the existence of the velocity vx does not in any way affect that
of the velocities vy or vz, since these are all at right angles to each
other and independent[.]
The obvious reading of this claim is that setting any value for the velocity com-
ponent vx does not affect what values vy and vz could possibly take; in other
words, that vx is value independent from vy and vz. This obvious reading ren-
ders the claim obviously true and in no need of further justification. As we
have seen before, Herschel emphasizes that value independence is the crucial
assumption that is needed to justify the factorization of the distribution to its
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Figure 3: Various ways of understanding the term “independent” in the proof of Proposition
IV.
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marginals. Given that Maxwell himself consistently used the term “indepen-
dent” in the sense of value independence in his other works prior to 1860 it
is then possible that he simply took what Herschel said for granted, and only
bothered to point out that value independence of the velocity components in
different directions clearly holds. Value independence of course does not imply
probabilistic independence, and hence the assumption that would have been
truly required for the mathematical proof remained unjustified.
According to another reading Maxwell was merely sloppy stating his assump-
tion in the quoted claim, and what he really meant was that setting any value
for the velocity component vx does not affect the probability of vy and vz taking
their values. This reading seemingly finds support in what he says in his 1867
recollection that the 1860 proof was
[...] founded on the assumption that the probability of a molecule
having a velocity resolved parallel to x lying between given limits is
not in any way affected by the knowledge that the molecule has a
given velocity resolved parallel to y. (Maxwell, 1867, p. 437)
Aside from the curious allusion to ‘knowledge’ this recollection correctly states
that the proof of Proposition IV requires the assumption of probabilistic inde-
pendence of vx and vy. What the recollection does not make clear, however, is
whether Maxwell also intended to rely on the assumption of probabilistic inde-
pendence (as opposed to the assumption of value independence) back in 1860,
and so this later reflection of Maxwell in itself can not be taken as evidence
for an awareness of a distinction between probabilistic independence and value
independence at the time when he produced his first proof. All we know is that
in 1867 Maxwell found this reformulated independence requirement sufficiently
“precarious” to warrant the construction of a different proof.
In the rest of this section we follow the latter reading, namely that Maxwell
intended to have assumed a sort of probabilistic independence. It is still not
entirely clear what could have been the intended carrier of the assumption of
probabilistic independence according to Maxwell’s 1867 recollection (see Figure
3 for some possibilities). Although Maxwell seemingly talks about the veloc-
ity components of an individual particle, the velocity components of individual
particles have a definite value at any given time, rendering any talk about a
particle having a velocity component with some probability obscure (unless we
either interpret probability as ignorance – the above mentioned appearance of
the term ‘knowledge’ may indicate that – or unless with a great dose of anachro-
nism we give up definiteness of velocity values along the lines of an objective
interpretation of the collision probabilities). It is more in line with the frequen-
tist allures of the 1860 proof to take the probabilistic independence assumption
to be a statement about a collection of particles, namely that the distribution
of velocities along the y axis for all particles is the same as the distribution of
velocities along the y axis for the particles whose velocity component along the
x axis is set to some value.
Does the Illustrations provide a justification for the assumption of proba-
bilistic independence of velocity components of a collection of particles, or does
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at least have the resources to do so? With our reconstruction of Propositions
I–III at hand the obvious guess is to trace back the assumption of probabilistic
independence to Condition M. Recall that Condition M states that whenever
two particles collide the impact parameter ρ is distributed uniformly within a
circle C. The ‘whenever’ part of this assumption presumably states that ρ is
distributed uniformly regardless what are the incoming velocities of the pair of
colliding particles or what is the configuration of other particles that are not
participating in the collision. In a precise formulation this would presumably
translate to conditional probabilistic independence of ρ from the incoming veloc-
ities of the pair and from other physical quantities characterizing the remaining
particles. If so then Condition M already furnishes a sort of probabilistic in-
dependence assumption regarding the velocities of a particle pair, and it is not
inconceivable that some clever aggregation procedure would then lend credence
to the assumption of probabilistic independence of velocity components of a
collection of particles.
Maxwell himself does not hint at such argument in the Illustrations, but
associating Condition M (and its consequence, Condition A) with a sense of
probabilistic independence that is required for a derivation of the velocity dis-
tribution was so deep that even in 1894, during an ignited debate on the pages
of Nature about the validity of Boltzmann’s H-theorem, Condition A and the
Stosszahlansatz (the crucial independence assumption about factorization of
the velocity probability distribution that appears in Maxwell’s 1867 proof) gets
identified and interchanged without justification or warning (for a detailed ac-
count see Dias (1994)). If the non-interchangeability of these assumptions did
not occur to prominent physicists who had the advantage of many years of de-
velopments that followed Maxwell’s 1860 proof, it seems reasonable to assume
that it might have not occurred to Maxwell either. Hence Maxwell might have
thought that Condition M, whose geometrical meaning is at least apparent, and
which (as Gyenis (2005) ventures) may be loosely motivated on the basis of
Clausius’ mean free path approach, justifies the probabilistic independence of
vx and vy.
It would be interesting to see, but I do not know of a formally satisfying
investigation of the relationship of Condition M and the assumption of proba-
bilistic independence of velocity components of a collection of particles. Clearly,
any such investigation would require that first someone says exactly what Con-
dition M states.
7.3. (A3) Rotational symmetry of the velocity distribution
Maxwell’s justification of the assumption of rotational symmetry of the ve-
locity distribution is physically intuitive: nothing in the argument he gave for
the factorization of the velocity distribution depends on the particular choice of
the oblique coordinate system, and the physical behavior of the colliding par-
ticles should clearly not depend on how we choose to describe their behavior.
Requiring that the factorization holds for other oblique coordinate systems en-
tails that the distribution only depends from the distance from the origin. This
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result also follows when we only resort to non-dependence from choice of orthog-
onal coordinate systems, in which case it can be conveniently mathematically
expressed as
f(vx)f(vy)f(vz) = φ(v
2
x + v
2
y + v
2
z),
which is what Maxwell writes. (Note that the orthogonality assumption is not
essential, only convenient. With any oblique coordinate system the functional
equation (1) still has a unique solution, a generalized normal distribution.)
To sum up, among the three mathematical assumptions of Maxwell’s Propo-
sition IV (A1) stationarity was intended to be justified on the basis of prior as-
sumptions about particle collisions, (A2) probabilistic independence of velocity
components was either misunderstood as value independence or was intended
to be justified on the basis of prior assumptions about particle collisions, and
(A3) rotational symmetry was supposed to follow from the non-dependence
of the argument for the assumption of probabilistic independence of velocity
components from the choice of coordinate system. Maxwell’s analysis and as-
sumptions regarding particle collisions hence played a crucial motivational role
for the mathematical assumptions of Proposition IV.
Finally note that if the number of particles is finite then the actual distri-
bution of velocities at any time must be discrete and have a bounded support.
However the only measurable solution of the functional equation (1), the Gaus-
sian (2), is a continuous function with infinite support. To reconcile this tension
one would need to give up at least one of the assumptions: one could insist
that stationarity, rotational symmetry, or probabilistic independence only holds
approximately, or that Maxwell’s velocity distribution f merely provides an ap-
proximate description. This is one of a number of issues relating to Proposition
IV that we leave here undiscussed as they have been thoroughly addressed in
the literature; for an overview see Uffink (2007, pp. 945–946).
8. Conclusions
The mathematical essence of the proof of Proposition IV is that a velocity
distribution f(~v) follows the Maxwell velocity distribution law if it satisfies the
mathematical assumptions of probabilistic independence f(~v) = fx(vx)fy(vy)fz(vz)
and rotational symmetry f(~v) = f(|~v|). The mathematical essence of a proof
may however mislead about what in it needs to be endowed with physical mean-
ing and justification. We argued that emphasizing the importance of the implicit
assumption of the existence of a stationary velocity distribution f(~v) make the
need for an argument for an approach to equilibrium clear and this in turn may
shed light on the role Maxwell’s widely ignored molecular collision model played
in his Illustrations of the Dynamical Theory of Gases. In particular we showed
that for perfectly elastic particles Maxwell’s Proposition I–III – under the as-
sumptions that their time evolution satisfies the constraint that it can be split
into successive time intervals during which each particle has an approximately
equal independent chance to participate in at most one, pairwise collision, and
that in this interval the impact parameter is approximately equally distributed
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on the collision circle (Condition M) – yields a good “bad” mechanical proof of
approach to equilibrium temperature, a precursor to Boltzmann’s H-theorem,
which also lends partial credence to the availability of a proof of reaching a
stationary velocity distribution. We argued that Condition M of Proposition
II furnishes a sort of probabilistic independence assumption regarding velocities
that could have motivated the assumption of probabilistic independence, but we
also suggested another potential explanation for the apparent lack of effort on
the part of Maxwell to justify probabilistic independence, namely that Maxwell
might have conflated the notions of probabilistic independence and value inde-
pendence. We argued that distinction of meaning of these two notions was not
yet available in the 1850’s and we presented circumstantial evidence for these
claims on the basis of relevant prior works of Clausius, Herschel, and Maxwell.
Section 7 explored the ways how Propositions I–III, Condition M, and the
approach to equilibrium furnished by a reconstructed version of Proposition VI
could have played a role in Maxwell’s physical justification of the three math-
ematical assumptions of Proposition IV; we have seen that there are multiple
interpretative possibilities. In closing let me choose the interpretation which
seems to me most plausible. On a physical basis Maxwell knew that after a
sufficient amount of time a box of gas settles into a thermal equilibrium, and he
made the important realization that supplementing a standard Newtonian colli-
sion model with the seemingly innocuous Condition M allows the proof of such
an approach to thermal equilibrium if the particles are modeled as perfectly elas-
tic spheres. Maxwell implicitly assumed that the onset of this equilibrium also
entails that the velocity distribution function becomes stationary. Thinking that
the existence of a stationary velocity distribution can be proved on a physical
basis he looked around for mathematical proofs that could be used to char-
acterize properties of such stationary distributions, and he recalled Herschel’s
characterization of the distribution of errors from reading his Essays as such.
Unfortunately Herschel mischaracterized the crucial independence assumption
of his own proof, and Maxwell implemented Herschel’s proof together with this
mischaracterization to the context of the kinetic theory. In turn the physical
justification of the so-mischaracterized independence assumption (and as a con-
sequence also the assumption of rotational symmetry) seemed straightforward.
Maxwell later realized that this independence assumption is “precarious” and
since other considerations also led him to abandon Clausius’ mean free path
approach that lies behind the collision model, he also abandoned the attempt
to establish stationarity of the velocity distribution via Condition M. It took
several decades until the scientific community came to a clear grasp of the dis-
tinctions between various interpretations of probability and various notions of
independence, and thus Maxwell’s early mistake in his first paper on the kinetic
theory was by no means an obvious one.
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Appendix
Let ~v and ~V be the incoming velocities and ~v ′ and ~V ′ be the rebound ve-
locities of two spheres of masses m and M that undergo a perfectly elastic
collision. Due to conservation of momentum the velocity of the center of mass
is unchanged by the collision:
~vCM
.
=
m~v +M~V
m+M
=
m~v ′ +M~V ′
m+M
.
= ~v ′CM . (13)
Let ~r, ~R (and ~r ′, ~R ′) denote the incoming (and rebound) velocities relative
to this center of mass, that is
~r
.
= ~v − ~vCM = ~v − m~v +M
~V
m+M
=
M
m+M
(~v − ~V ) (14)
~R
.
= ~V − ~vCM = ~V − m~v +M
~V
m+M
=
m
m+M
(~V − ~v) (15)
~r ′ .= ~v ′ − ~v ′CM = ~v ′ − ~vCM (16)
~R ′ .= ~V ′ − ~v ′CM = ~V ′ − ~vCM , (17)
and hence noting that v
.
= ‖~v‖, V .= ‖~V ‖, v′ .= ‖~v ′‖ etc. we get
r2 = ~r · ~r =
(
M
m+M
)2 (
~v · ~v + ~V · ~V − 2~v · ~V
)
(18)
=
(
M
m+M
)2 (
v2 + V 2 − 2vV cos(α)) , (19)
R2 = ~R · ~R =
(
m
m+M
)2 (
~v · ~v + ~V · ~V − 2~v · ~V
)
(20)
=
(
m
m+M
)2 (
v2 + V 2 − 2vV cos(α)) , (21)
v2CM = ~vCM · ~vCM =
m~v +M~V
m+M
· m~v +M
~V
m+M
= (22)
=
(
1
m+M
)2 (
m2~v · ~v +M2~V · ~V + 2mM~v · ~V
)
(23)
=
(
1
m+M
)2 (
m2v2 +M2V 2 + 2mMvV cos(α)
)
(24)
with α
.
= ∠(~v, ~V ).
From (16), (17), and from r′ = r, R′ = R (which we get from (5) where we
utilized that the collision is perfectly elastic) we get
v′2 = (~vCM + ~r ′) · (~vCM + ~r ′) = v2CM + r′2 + 2~vCM · ~r ′ (25)
= v2CM + r
2 + 2vCMr cos(γ) (26)
V ′2 = (~vCM + ~R ′) · (~vCM + ~R ′) = v2CM +R′2 + 2~vCM · ~R ′ (27)
= v2CM +R
2 − 2vCMR cos(γ) (28)
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with γ
.
= ∠(~vCM , ~r ′) and noting that ∠(~vCM , ~R ′) = 180o − ∠(~vCM , ~r ′).
Multiplying (26) with m/2, (28) with M/2, subtracting them from each
other, and making judicious substitutions for r2 (eq. (19)), R2 (eq. (21)), and
v2CM (eq. (24)) yields
mv′2
2
− MV
′2
2
=
m
2
(
v2CM + r
2 + 2vCMr cos(γ)
)
−M
2
(
v2CM +R
2 − 2vCMR cos(γ)
)
=
m
2
(
1
m+M
)2 (
m2v2 +M2V 2 + 2mMvV cos(α)
)
+
m
2
(
M
m+M
)2 (
v2 + V 2 − 2vV cos(α))+ m
2
2vCMr cos(γ)
−M
2
(
1
m+M
)2 (
m2v2 +M2V 2 + 2mMvV cos(α)
)
−M
2
(
m
m+M
)2 (
v2 + V 2 − 2vV cos(α))+ M
2
2vCMR cos(γ)
=
1
2
(
1
m+M
)2
(m3v2 +mM2V 2 + 2m2MvV cos(α)
+mM2v2 +mM2V 2 − 2mM2vV cos(α)
−m2Mv2 −M3V 2 − 2mM2vV cos(α)
−m2Mv2 −m2MV 2 + 2m2MvV cos(α))
+(mr +MR)vCM cos(γ)
= +
1
2
(
1
m+M
)2
(mv2(m2 +M2 − 2mM)
−MV 2(m2 +M2 − 2mM))
+2
(
1
m+M
)2
(m−M)mMvV cos(α)
+(mr +MR)vCM cos(γ)
= C0 ·
(
mv2
2
− MV
2
2
)
+ C1 · cos(α) + C2 · cos(γ)
with
C0
.
=
(
m−M
m+M
)2
, (29)
C1
.
= 2
(m−M)
(m+M)2
mMvV, (30)
C2
.
= (mr +MR)vCM , (31)
which proves equation (7). Clearly, 0 ≤ C0 < 1.
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